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Summary  findings
Amjadi and Winters explore the argument that trade  Amjadi and Winters also explore the argument that
between the Mercosur countries should be stimulated by  absolutely high transportation  costs between Mercosur
preferential policies because of their geographic  and the rest of the world  (that is, nor relative to intra-
proximity. That is, that the Mercosur  countries are  Mercosur costs) justify regional trade preferences. For
candidates for "natural"  integration.  this to apply the introduction  of trade preferences must
They find that, on average, transportation  margins on  cause the Mercosur countries to cease importing some
trade within Mercosur and between Mercosur  and Chile  goods from the rest of the world completely. While
are about 6 percentage points lower than on trade with  Mercosur-rest-of-the-wortd  transport costs certainly are
the rest of the world. That is a significant margin, and  high, trade patterns suggest that very few goods will
one that was reflected in the countries'  trade patterns  cease to be imported from the rest of the world.
even before regional trade agreements reduced the  Finally, Amjadi and Winters find that transport
policy-based barriers to mutual trade. But it is probably  margins on imports are, on average, 2 to 4 percentage
not large enough, in and of itself (without other  points higher for Mercosur countries than for the United
benefits), to make the introduction  of trade preferences  States. Further research on why this is so is necessary
desirable.  before one can conclude that avoidable inefficiencies are
involved.
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As regional trading arrangements  (RTAs) have spread, enlarged and deepened over the last
decade, they have posed challenges to econornists  on both intellectual and policy levels. On the
former, do RTAs stimulate growth and investment, facilitate technology transfer, shift comparative
advantage towards high value-added activities, provide credibility to reform programs, or induce
politicEd  stability and cooperation? Or do they, on the other hand, divert trade in inefficient
directions and undermine the multilateral trading system?
The answer is probably "all of these things, in different proportions according to the
particular circumstances of each RTA." This then poses the policy challenge of how best to
manage RTAs in order to get the best balance of benefits and costs. For example, should technical
standards be harmonized and, if so, how; do direct or indirect taxes need to be equalized; how
should RTAs manage their international trade policies in an outward-looking fashion?
Addressing these issues is one important focus of the research program of the International
Trade Division of the World Bank. It has produced a number of methodological innovations in the
traditional area of trade effects of RTAs and is now starting to tackle four new areas of research: the
dynamics of regionalism (e.g., convergence,  growth, investment, industrial location and migration),
deep integration (standards, tax harmonization),  regionalism and the rest of the world (including its
effects on the multilateral trading system), and certain political economy dimensions of regionalism
(e.g., c:redibility  and the use of RTAs as tools of diplomacy).
In addition to thematic work, the program includes a number of studies of specific regional
arrangements, conducted in collaboration with the Regional Vice Presidencies of the Bank.  Several
EU-Mediterranean Association Agreements have been studied and a joint program with the staff of
the Latin American and Caribbean Region entitled "Making  the Most of Mercosur"  is under way.
Future work is planned on African and Asian regional integration schemes.
Regionalism and Development findings have been and will, in future, be released in a
number of outlets. Recent World Bank Policy Research Working Papers concerning these issues
include:
Glenn Harrison, Tom Rutherford and David Tarr, "Economic Implications for Turkey
of a Customs Union with the European Union," (No. 1599).
Maurice Schiff, "Small is Beautiful, Preferential Trade Agreements and the Impact of
Country Size, Market Share, Efficiency and Trade Policy," (No. 1668).
L. Alan Winters, "Regionalism versus Multilateralism," (No. 1687).
Planned future issues in this series include:
Eric Bond, "An Operational Model for Assessing Preferential Trading Arrangements"
Sherry Stephenson, "Standards, Conformity Assessments and Developing Countries"Maurice  Schiff  and L. Alan Winters,  "Regional  Integration  as Diplomacy"
Anthony  Venables  and Diego  Puga, "Trading  Arrangements  and Industrial
Development"
L. Alan Winters  and Won Chang,  "Integration  and  Non-Member  Welfare:  Measuring
the Price Effects"
Glenm  Harrison,  Thomas  Rutherford  and David  Tarr,  "Trade  Policy  Options  for Chile:
A Quantitative  Evaluation"
In addition,  Making  the Most of Mercosur  will be issuing  papers  over  the next few  months,
including:
Alexander  J. Yeats,  "Does  Mercosur's  Trade  Performance  Raise  Concerns  About  the
Effects  of Regional  Trade  Arrangements?"
Claudio  Frischtak,  Danny  M. Leipziger  and  John  F. Normand,  "Industrial  Policy  in
Mercosur:  Issues  and  Lessons"
Sam Laird  (WTO),  "Mercosur  Trade  Policy:  Towards  Greater  Integration"
Margaret  Miller  and Jerry  Caprio,  "Empirical  Evidence  on the Role  of Credit  for SME
Exports  in Mercosur"
Malcom  Rowat,  "Competition  Policy  within  Mercosur"
For copies  of these  papers  or information  about  these  programs  contact  Maurice  Schiff,  The
World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington,  D.C.  20433.
An additional  major  outlet  for World  Bank-sponsored  research  on regionalism  will be the
Annual  Bank  Conference  on Development  in Latin  America,  1997,  Montevideo,  June 30-July  2,
1997,  organized  by the Office  of the Chief  Economist  and the Technical  Department  for Latin
America  and  the Caribbean  Region,  with the support  of the International  Trade  Division  and the
Economic  Development  Institute.
Masood  Ahmed
Director
International  Economics  Department
..1. Introduction
One theme of the recent debate about the virtues of regional trading arrangements
has been the notion of "natural" trading partners. Defined in terms of the existing level of
trade between the prospective partners this is not a particularly useful concept, for trade is
plainly endogenous with respect to the policy environment. If we define "natural" in
terms of unavoidable transactions costs, on the other hand, there does appear to be
content in the idea.  Transportation costs have a strong exogenous component and so
could be useful in this regard, as Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) have demonstrated.  They
define a bloc as natural if moving to free trade within it raises the welfare of its members.
Strictly speaking, this definition is also circular, but the basis of the welfare effect Frankel
et al derive is lower transportation costs within the bloc than between it and the outside
world, and so it is basically operational.  In transportation terms the creation of Mercosur
would seem to be a prime candidate for the soubriquet "natural":  the member countries
are contiguous but isolated from the rest of the world.  Hufbauer and Schott (1994) have,
for example, suggested that Mercosur is a natural trading bloc.
The paper seeks to explore this characterization of Mercosur directly by offering
empirical evidence on the costs of transportation on international trade within Mercosur
and between the Mercosur countries and their principal trading partners.  There are many
transactions costs on international trade that we cannot capture.  On the basis of the
evidence we do have, however, it appears that while exploiting differences in
trarLsportation  costs may generate some benefits from Mercosur's moving to internal free
trale,  these will be small.  The justification for creating the bloc must be sought
elsewhere.  For the purpose of comparison, and because of the recent moves towardscloser  integration,  we also include  Chile in our empirical  work. Thus  the set of countries
whose  transportation  costs we examine  and which  we loosely  refer  to as "Mercosur"  is
Argentina,  Brazil,  Paraguay,  Uruguay  and Chile.
Part 2 of this paper considers  the role of transportation  costs in the theory of
regionalism  in the context of models  of differentiated  products. This model, developed
by Frankel,  Stein and Wei (1995),  focuses  on the difference  between  intra- and inter-bloc
transportation  costs and argues  that the larger  it is the more  beneficial  is integration. The
model  has two particular  features  which appear  to reduce  its applicability  to the real
world,  however  - see section  2.1: (a) despite  having  a production  sector, it is effectively
an endowment  model,  and (b) all costs of transportation  are borne  by consumers. Section
2.2 discusses  a source  of detailed  transportation  costs data and section  2.3 presents  results
on the differences  between  Mercosur's  intra and inter-bloc  costs. These  average  about 6
to 8 percentage  points (6% to 8% of the non-transport  cost of the transaction). Frankel  et
al's model is not readily  related  to the real  world,  but their results suggest  that, by itself, a
6% differential  is not enough  to generate  significant  gains from  intra-bloc  free trade.
Part 3 of the paper shifts  to a more  traditional  model  with homogeneous  goods, in
which  it is only transportation  costs with the rest of the world that matter.  This model
also has particular  features  underlying  its conclusion  that  transportation  costs can allow
scope  for additional  benefits  from integration:  specifically,  if two members  of the bloc
trade a good after  integration,  the exporter  should  have  had no other  market before
integration  and the importer  no other supplier  after integration.  Although  Mercosur's
costs of trading  with the rest of the world are high enough  to promise  scope  for
2significant  gains from regional  preferences,  few  commodities  meet even  the second of
these conditions.
Part 4 of the paper extends  the exercise  to ask whether  it is realistic  for Mercosur
coumtries  to aim  to reduce  their  transportation  costs with the rest of the world. For a
series  of distant suppliers  we compare  the transport  component  of import costs for
Mercosur  with that for imports  to the United  States. In general  the evidence  suggests  that
Mercosur  buyers  pay a few  percent  more than  American  buyers  and that therefore  there is
some  scope for efficiency  gains.  In fact,  since 1993-the year of our data-a  number  of
reforms  and modernizations  have  occurred,  so the Mercosur  countries  may already  be
reaping  these gains. Finally,  section  5 concludes.
2. Transport  Costs  in Models  of Differentiated  Products
2.1 Theory
One approach  to the role of transport  costs in the theory of regionalism  stems
from Jeff Frankel's extension  of Paul Krugman's  two celebrated  contributions  (1  991  a, b).
Frankel, Stein  and Wei (1995)  envision  a symmetric  world  of C continents  each of N
coumtries.  Transport  costs are of the iceberg  type such that intra-continental  trade entails
a wastage  factor of a-that  is, of each  unit shipped,  only (1-a) arrives-and inter-
conitinental  trade an additional  wastage  of b-only  (1  -a) (1  -b) arrives. Within  each
coumtry,  goods  are produced  by labor alone,  with a fixed cost and constant  marginal  cost,
i = a +Ox  where £ is labor  demand  and  x output. (Symmetry  means that all goods are
identical  so we need  no subscripts  here). Consumers  around  the world  maximize  a utility
3function, u = E ci0, subject to a budget constraint, where i counts across goods and (14-)
is the elasticity of substitution between goods. All goods are consumed in positive
quantities. Imported goods face a tariff t, which is not levied on partners in an integration
scheme.
While this model is elegant and powerful, it does have some very particular
features.  First a series of now standard manipulations shows that the number of products
produced in each economy (n) is constant [n = L(I-0)/cx], output of each good is constant
[x = a  0/4(1-0)], and producer prices are constant [p = 1w/01, where w is the wage, which
is also constant because of the constant marginal input-output co-efficient.  Thus this is
effectively an endowment model.
Now consider the form of transportation costs.  Iceberg costs have the analytically
attractive feature that they do not affect the elasticity of demand. It is this that permits the
invariance on the production side that we have just noted. The fixed producer price
means that consumers bear all the cost of transportation; their welfare is affected only
through the prices they face.  Consumers choose between three types of goods:
*  domestic goods, presumed to be free of all trade costs, at price p;
*  "partner goods" from other countries on the continent at price
pp= p/(1-a) + pt
*  where t is the tariff, which will be removed if the continent integrates;I and
It is not particularly significant to the results that the tariff is levied on the producer price.  In this model,
where transport costs subtract value, this formulation is equivalent to paying the tariff on the c.i.f. price!
4"non-partner goods" from other continents at price
Pn= p/(l-a)(1-b)  + pt.
Integration changes the proportions in which consumers buy these goods by
removing a distortion between domestic and partner goods, and introducing one between
partner and non-partner goods. As in traditional customs union theory, such changes
might or might not have beneficial effects as consumer surplus is traded against lost tariff
revenue.  In this model, however, they also have a second effect, by changing the net
wastage of goods on transportation: they switch some demand from goods with zero
transport costs to those with costs a, which absorbs resources, and some from goods with
costs (a + b - ab) to those with a, which releases resources.  Again the net effect is
ambiguous.  The balance of these effects depends on the vector of parameters in a
complex fashion and Frankel, Stein and Wei are able to solve their model only
numerically.  They find, however, that the increase in the welfare stemming from intra-
continental free trade (which is assumed to proceed symmetrically on all continents) is
larger the higher is b, the inter-continental transport factor.  Essentially, a higher wastage
factor reduces consumption of non-partner goods; this reduces absolutely the degree of
trade diversion and although the distortion cost of a unit of diversion is higher because
the marginal value of the "under-consumed" goods is higher, this latter effect is off-set by
the fact that any diversion that does occur offers a large real resource saving in terms of
transportation.
It is very difficult to know how to relate models such as this to reality, but
Franikel,  Stein and Wei pay a lot of attention to the results of one particular simulation,
5with three continents each of two countries, an elasticity of substitution of four, tariffs of
30% and zero intra-continental transportation costs (a = 0).  This constellation of values
suggests that if inter-continental costs, b, fall below about 15 percentage points (and
hence exceed intra-continental costs by that amount), then integration reduces welfare-
it is, in their term, "super-natural."  Frankel, Stein and Wei are frank that some sets of
parameters - e.g. less substitutability coupled with higher tariffs - do not generate
losses for any value of b, and Nitsche (1996) suggests the same conclusion if intra-
continent transport costs, a, were increased from zero to 0.05 in the basic model.  Thus
while one clearly can not take these results too seriously, they do seem to suggest that
unless inter-continental transport costs are quite high, there is not much mileage in the
notion that transportation cost differences offer a case for regional integration along
"natural bloc" lines.
The critical empirical magnitude in the discussion above is the relative size of
intra and inter-continental transport costs.  The rest of this section is devoted to
measuring this for Mercosur, first describing the available data and then examining some
results.
2.2 Data on transportation costs
Data on Mercosur imports were obtained from the ALADI Secretariat to whom
we are most grateful.  They are available for the years 1991 through 1994 with the
exception of Uruguay which lacks (1991,2) and Argentina (1991). We restrict our
analyses to 1993, however, because we have similar data on US imports and transport
costs for this one year-see  Amjadi, Winters and Yeats (1996).  The data are recorded at
6the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS), and they record import values (fo.b.)  in
US$, transport and insurance costs, and quantities.  Since we have import charges only as
a total for the United States, we add the Mercosur transport and insurance components to
calculate what we call the transport costs in this paper.
The United States tabulates imports, by product and country, on a joint free-
alongside-ship (f.a.s.) and cost-insurance-freight (c.i.f.) basis.  According to the US
practice, the f.a.s. valuation includes the purchase price of the product plus all charges
incurred in placing merchandise along side the vessel at the port of exportation. The
difference between the c.i.f. and f.a.s. valuations reflect loading costs plus transport and
insurance costs for the international segment of the journey excluding the costs of
2 unloading.
For both groups, transportation costs are expressed as a proportion of the value of
trade in the heading.  The tables below report statistics-including  various weighted
averages of these individual heading data.
2.3  Relative transportation costs on Mercosur's imports
The theories built around differentiated goods and imperfect competition stress
the differences between intra- and inter-bloc transportation costs as determinants of the
benefits of regional integration.  Table 1 addresses these concerns directly, comparing
transportation costs of trade within Mercosur with those applying to the bloc's imports
from elsewhere.  It is clear from the first two rows that average transportation costs on
2 In this  regard  Mercosur  data  differ  from  US data  which  include  unloading.
7intra-Mercosur  trade are lower  than  those on trade  with the rest of the world-but,  at
about 6 percentage  points  for the two  main countries,  not massively  so.
In fact the results in table 1  probably  slightly  exaggerate  the difference  in
transport costs between  Mercosur  and non-Mercosur  suppliers  because  they are
calculated  using weights  from the former. For fairly obvious  reasons  average  costs seem
lower when one uses a country's own exports  as weights. The figures also exclude  flows
with recorded  transportation  costs of zero. The bias that this causes  is unclear. To the
extent  that such flows represent  shipments  crossing  at a land  frontier  (e.g.,  Argentina-
Uruguay),  omitting  this leads  us to understate  the advantages  of intra-Mercosur  trade.
However,  this is off-set  by a counteracting  force. Our criterion  entails  observing  zero
transport  costs on all shipments  of a particular  heading  in a year. If (N-1) of them record
zero, but the Nth records  positive  costs, our annual  data show  very low average  transport
costs for the year. In one sense  this is a reasonable  average,  but if the heading  is
heterogeneous  such that, say, varieties  that the rest of the world can supply  must travel by
air while those  that only Mercosur  can supply  travel by road,  the average  for Mercosur
over the two sorts  of good will overstate  Mercosur's transport  advantage  on the "outside"
good.
In fact, however,  many of the zero-cost  flows  look to arise from conceptual
problems  or recording  errors:  Uruguay  records  more such flows with non-Mercosur
partners  (6% of imports),  than Mercosur  partners  (4%), and Brazil  reports  some (4%) on
imports  from North America. These may  reflect  transshipment  consignments  which
8should for our purposes be associated with the costs of their first leg.  Overall, therefore,
there is little that can be made out of the zeros.
We also considered two further refinements of table 1. Although for each entry in
the table the transport costs for each heading are weighted together by the same weights
(Mercosur's imports of the heading from Mercosur), there are still cases in which a
particular heading has to be omitted from a particular importer-exporter average because
it has no recorded trade for that pair. Thus we have also recalculated the averages for
Arg;entina,  Brazil and Chile using precisely the same set of headings along each row (i.e.,
we have included only headings for which all three importers have imports from
Mercosur and non-Mercosur respectively). It makes no material difference.  Second we
have recalculated the top two rows of the table using precisely the same set of headings
for each entry in a given column-that  is, comparing transport costs only on goods that
the importer concerned imports from both Mercosur and from the rest of the world. This
widens the margin between Mercosur and the rest of the world trade by 0.7 percentage
points for Argentina, 1.7 for Brazil, 2.3 for Paraguay, 7.7 for Uruguay and 0.2 for Chile.
Except for Uruguay-for  which no data seem wholly reliable-these  do not change the
basic argument that the difference between the two sets of transport costs is not a major
factor in the case for integration.
93.  Homogeneous Goods
3.1  A model
We turn now to an alternative model which deals only with homogeneous goods.
The role of transportation costs in integration theory was first isolated by Wonnacott and
Wonnacott (1981  )-hereafter  WW8 1. They argued that-contrary  to the prevailing
wisdom-integration  between neighboring countries could offer benefits that were not
available to either partner individually through unilateral trade liberalization.
In essence, they argued, preferences between neighbors could divert trade with the
rest of the world, which was expensive in terrns of transportation costs, to take place
instead with neighbors which were cheaper partners in transportation termns.  The
resulting savings of real resources would allow one partner to experience a terms of trade
of gain-either  the exporting partner saving the costs of shipping the good to the rest of
the world or the importing partners saving the cost of shipping in from there.
The original WW8  1 argument is illustrated in figure 3.1.  Country C, the rest of
the world, is large and hence has straight-line offer curves vis-a-vis the two potential
partners, A and B.  Trade with either A or B, however, entails transport costs and so the
relative price at which C will sell X for Y differs from that at which it will sell Y for X.
Specifically, if A or B sells X it faces offer curve Ox,  while if it sells Y it faces Oy.  (C's
internal terms of trade lie in-between.) Now introduce A's and B's offer-curves,  each
distorted by an mfn tariff but assume that trading between themselves involves no
transactions costs. (This means that the same offer curve describes an A/B trade from both
partners' points of view.) Thus A exports X along OA and B exports Y along 0h.
10Imagine first that there were no transport costs and that C were prepared to buy or
sell X at any point along 0x.  With (mfn) tariff-ridden offer curves 0 A  and 0B and no trade
wilh C, A and B could trade with each other to point D.  But A can do better than this by
selling X to C to attain point J, and B will be left out of international commerce unless it too
x off  ,rs prices competitive with Ox.  This it will do (rather than have no trade) and buy X to
achieve point K.  (With no transport costs with either A or C it is indifferent about which
partner it trades with, but when we introduce such costs it will be evident that A and B will
trade to point K and A and C will then trade further to take A to point J.)
Now suppose that A and B form a CU offering each other tariff-free access along
o02  and o2B. Technically they could trade at point E.  This is desirable for A, whose terms
of trade improve from J to E; A also prefers it to unilateral liberalization which would take
it only to point M.  For B, on the other hand, the CU may or may not dominate the initial
point K-there  is more trade but on less favorable terms; E is clearly dominated, however,
by point N which B could achieve by unilateral mfn liberalization.  (Recall that we have
temriporarily  assumed that C will buy or sell X along Ox.)  In other words, the CU does not
make sense for B.  Moreover, as WW assert, A cannot simultaneously compensate B to
move from N to E and gain itself relative to M.  In summary, when there are no transport
costs with C, creating a CU between A and B is dominated by unilateral liberalization for
one party and hence does not offer a viable alternative.
Now modify figure 3.1 to recognize transport costs with C.  To make use of the
same diagram, assume that C will continue to buy X along Ox but sell X (buy Y) only
along 0  . The initial equilibrium is at K and J as before, with C's relative price for buying
11X defining the terms of trade between A and B.  B buys its X from A at the same price as C
Y does, which is considerably better than it could do by buying from C along 0 C. A buys its
Y partly from B (up to K) and partly from C (KJ).
When A and B form a CU the equilibrium E arises again, but now it is potentially
desirable from both A's and B's viewpoints.  The story for A is as before, while that for B
contrasts E not with N but with M, its best alternative  with (partial) unilateral liberalization.
With A on offer curve 
0 2,  B benefits by gradually liberalizing, gradually pushing its offer
curve out toward 02.  The equilibrium moves out along Ox until at M, B just takes all A's
exports, but at prices defined by C (because C still provides the marginal potential trade).
As B liberalizes further it moves towards E which may or may not be better than M.  The
apparently desirable option of expanding further along Ox to N is not available, because
purchasing X beyond what  A will sell at point M requires either paying more to  A's
Y 3 producers (along ME) or paying transport costs to C and flipping to 0Y.
Figure 3.2 summarizes the above argument in what to many people appears to be a
more accessible,  partial equilibrium, fashion. This is also useful in illustrating the empirical
applications which we undertake below.  We imagine the market for an import in country
A.  For simplicity, we assume that there is no domestic production, but, fundamentally, we
assume that prior to integration A buys from both B and C. 4 Country C is prepared to buy
the good from A or B at a price that yields the suppliers returns of Px, and to sell it to A at
This analysis  looks  at B's options  after A has liberalized. Strictly  speaking,  unilateral  liberalization
would  entail expanding  from K to J and then along OA  which  is less attractive  than the case in the text.
4Wonnacott and Wonnacott  (1  992)-WW92--offer similar  diagrammatic  expositions  of the simpler  case
in which  A imports  only from B both  before  and after integration.
12price PM where y - (PM  - PX) is the wedge due to transportation cost and tariffs in C.  In
addition A imposes an mfn tariff of t, making its pre-integration internal price (PM + t).
Country B supplies CH (=AE), the quantity on its supply curve, SB,  at A's border price, and
country C supplies EF, the remaining demand at A's internal price.
Now let A offer B tariff-free access to its market.  The latter now receives A's
internal price and expands supply along SB. At the new equilibrium, G, B becomes the sole
supiplier and  A's  intemal price  falls  below  the tariff-inclusive price  of  C's  supplies.
Consumers in A  gain areas (1) +  (2) + (3), producers in B  gain (4) + (5) +  (6) and
government in A loses (1) + (2) + (4) + (5) + (7).  This is a trade diverting union and it
could clearly be welfare reducing overall [if (3) + (6) < (7)], but, if it is not, it could provide
the basis for benefits not available to either A or B unilaterally.  Imagine that B has a
market exactly symmetric to that in figure 3.2.  If A and B swap mutual access concessions,
each gains (3) + (6) - (7).  Of course, both of A and B could do better through concerted
mfin liberalization-each  gaining (3) + (6) + (8). WW92 argue that this  would not be
unilateral liberalization correctly interpreted because it requires two countries to act, but on
the other hand, if A and B can agree to form a customs union could they not also agree to
concerted mfn liberalization? 5
Figure 3.2 does not replicate the result in figure 3.1 because the latter shows B's
supply curve of A's  importable shifting outwards as a  result of integration-essentially
because integration reduces distortions in B.  In figure 3.2 this would result in a supply
The answer  could clearly  be "no" once we add producer  lobbies  into  the deternination  of policy-see,
e.g., Winters  (1996).
13curve such as S'B, which would entail larger gains than previously.  Indeed, it is only with
such efficiency gains that the new equilibrium could have a price between Px and PM. Note
also that under this assumption a concerted mfn liberalization would result in exactly the
same outcome as the customs union.
Several points  should be noted about these examples in which the existence of
transport  costs  adds  to  the  case  for  regional  integration-that  is,  on  the  issue  of
transportation costs and natural trading blocs.  First, contrary to the statements in WW,
there is no role in any of this for transport costs between the partners.  It makes essentially
no difference whether SB in figure 3.2 or OB in figure 3.1 reflects efficient production and
very high intra-bloc transportation or inefficient production and zero transportation costs.
All that matters is the delivered price of B's exports to A.
Second, the gains from integration  rely on members of the bloc ceasing to trade with
the rest of the world.  If, after integration, trade continued with the (large) rest of the world,
A's internal prices would not change, there would be no consumer gains and consequently
joining a customs union would merely give away tariff revenue, see, for example, Bhagwati
and Panagariya (1996) or Schiff (1996).
Third, prior to integration, the exporting partner exported only to the other regional
partner. In Figure 3.1 country B, which sells good Y in return for X, can choose to sell to C
at price Oy or to A at price Ox, the (better) price at which C is prepared to sell Y to country
A. It clearly prefers the latter.
143.2 The Transport  Wedge
A critical factor in the homogenous good model's prediction of beneficial regional
integration  is  the  wedge  between  the  bloc's  buying  and  selling  prices  on  world
markets-the  size of the pencil between Ox'  and Oy in  figure 3.1.  This depends on
transport costs on both exports and imports. No country can effectively collect data on the
transportation costs levied on its exports and so we are obliged to represent the world by the
United States, the only other country for which data on the transport component on imports
is  available.  Fortunately this is  not too  large a distortion for the Mercosur countries,
although, of course, it would be highly desirable to extend the analysis to their other major
markets such as the EU and Japan.
Treating the United States as a  large market and  supplier, and representing its
domestic price by PD, Mercosur suppliers could receive PD - YUM  by selling in the United
States, where YUM  is the cost of transportation from Mercosur to the United States, while
Mercosur purchasers would need to pay PD + YMU to  obtain supplies from  the United
States, where ymu  is the cost of transportation from the United States to Mercosur.  These
define Px and PM respectively in figure 3.2.  The overall transportation wedge is (YMU  +
YUM)  which determines the range inside which Mercosur domestic factors could influence
the Mercosur price.
The range will actually be larger than this to the extent that Mercosur and the US
levy tariffs on their mutual trade, but it will be smaller to the extent that US mark-ups are
larger than  the  sum  of the  costs  of  internal transportation on  Mercosur  exports  and
15imports in the United States. 6 Thus by way of compromise here we look merely at the
transportation  wedge.  Two  further complications  condition the  interpretation  of  our
results.  First, in order to measure the transportation costs on flows in both directions
between the United States and Mercosur, we need to observe flows in both directions-
i.e., we need two-way trade.  This is consistent with there being homogeneous goods if
one  member  of Mercosur  exports the  good and  another imports  it, but  we have  not
insisted on this condition in this initial investigation.
The second complication concerns how to combine transportation costs in the two
directions.  We normally express unit transportation costs as a percentage of the unit value
of the goods.  If the latter varies significantly in the two directions, however, summing the
two  percentages  is  rather  uncomfortable,  because  the  denominators  are  not  strictly
comparable. Where the United States and Mercosur report trades in the same physical units
we could calculate transport costs per unit.  But this still leaves the problems of expressing
the  summed  costs  relative  to  something  in  order  to  make  them  comparable  across
commodities and of deciding which price to use as the anchor of the range.  We have,
therefore, decided merely  to  sum the  percentage costs.  Given that  Mercosur imports
6Let  US producers receive PI and US consumers pay P2, implying a mark-up of m: P2 = P 1 + m. Mercosur
exporters will receive Px = P 2 - YMU  - tusA  - rusA where tUSA is the tariff and rUSA is the US internal
transportation cost on Mercosur exports.  Mercosur consumers will pay  P'M  = PI + yum  + tMR +  SUSA  where
tMER  is Mercosur's tariff and SUSA  is the US transport component on US exports.  The Mercosur
"transaction wedge" is Pm  - PX =  (YMU  +  YUM) +  (tUSA  +  tMER)  +  (rUSA+  SUSA) - m-
16generally have higher unit values and higher percentage transport costs than Mercosur
exports, this will arguably understate the actual wedge. 7
Our transport wedges based on two-way Mercosur-US trade are calculated at the 6-
digit level of the HS, the US data being aggregated to that level-see  Amjadi, Winters and
Yeats (1996) for details of the US data.  They refer only to categories for which at least
$30,000 of trade was observed in each direction in 1993; ruling out very small flows helps
to eliminate very noisy transportation estimates.  In all 641 headings met our criteria for
inclusion; on average they have transportation wedges of 24% (mean) or 20% (median);
roughly one quarter of them are below 15% (Ql = 15.2%) and another quarter above 29%
(Q3 =  29.1).  These figures suggest considerable margins in which intra-Mercosur trade
could affect internal prices and that, prima facie, the transport-cost based advantages of
integration could be significant.
Table 2 offers a disaggregation of these results by sector.  It shows clearly that
manufactures have the smaller wedges-notably  as low as 11% on machinery  (electrical
pluas  mechanical) and 16% on vehicles.  As might be expected, the largest wedges are on
crade primary goods followed by agriculture.
3.3  Trade shares
The  other  testable  necessary  condition  for  integration  to  be  beneficial  in  a
homogeneous  products  world  is  that  after  integration  the  partners  trade  only  with
7Differences in unit values in the two directions  also suggest  that the two flows  are not identical. This
implies,  perhaps,  that  we should  prefer  the heterogeneous  to the homogeneous  goods  model.
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themselves and not with the rest of the world.  To identify products for which this is true
requires predictions of the trade effects of Mercosur which we do not have.  Moreover
even where  such predictions exist, the standard techniques for making them generally
rely on differentiated goods models in which trade shares respond to relative prices but no
products drop completely from the consumption set.  Thus we are not well equipped to
recognize cases where trade with one set of partners will wholly cease.
The best we can do is to seek to identify products for which Mercosur is currently
close to self-sufficiency and thus for which it may be plausible to expect integration to
eliminate  third  party  exports.  Moreover,  even  if  products  are  differentiated,  tariff
preferences on varieties (suppliers) which account for a high share of imports are likely to
have  larger  effects  on  the  price  of  all  imports  in  the  product  category  than  would
preferences on "minor" varieties.  Thus even within a differentiated goods paradigm it is
useful to identify headings for which Mercosur suppliers account for a high percentage of
Mercosur imports, for these are the products where the consumer benefits of integration
are likely to be largest.
Table 3 divides the 6-digit HS headings into groups according to the intra-bloc
share of  Mercosur countries'  imports.  It reports  the share of total  Mercosur  imports
accounted for by headings in each class, the number of headings and the average transport
costs (weighted and unweighted) on Mercosur and other imports.  Half of one percent of
imports come from headings in which Mercosur countries already have no non-Mercosur
8 As noted above a third condition is that the exporting partner in Mercosur exported to no-one else before
integration. However, given our data, we can not test this.
18suppliers.  In these cases integration will remove a distortion and create none, and hence
certainly generate welfare gains.  A further 2.2% of imports come from headings in which
Mercosur  is  heavily  predominant  (market  share  of  over  95%)  and  hence  in  which
"transport-cost-based" gains are most likely, and so on.  The vast bulk of imports fall in
headings  for which  Mercosur  countries take  more than  half their  imports from  non-
Mercosur sources and thus for which the elimination of such trade is highly unlikely.
To get a very rough feel for the significance of these data assume that Mercosur
has initial tariff of 20% on the relevant goods and that the elasticity of supply for them is
2.  Then, if the abolition of the tariff on intra-bloc trade were just to eliminate third party
imports-i.e.  the Mercosur share were to expand to just  100% of demand but have no
effect on the internal price-the  initial Mercosur share would have had to be  69.4%.9
That is, third country trade would be eliminated and internal price effects would occur
only  for  goods  for  which  the  initial  intra-bloc  share  exceeded approximately  70%,
perhaps 8% to 9% of total Mercosur imports.
Table 3 suggests that transportation costs do influence trade shares.  Where costs
are  highest-even  intra-Mercosur costs  exceed  13%-the  rest  of the  world  can  not
compete at all.  Thereafter as we move down the table, transport costs tend to fall until in
the last category (Mercosur share S 40%) Mercosur costs increase.  This presumably
partly  reflects  a  set  of  commodities  for  which  Mercosur  countries  have  inefficient
transport facilities and thus in which they can not effectively compete.
9R]emoving  a tariff of 20% increases  the return  to Mercosur  suppliers  from I to 1.2. With  an elasticity  of 2
this implies  a 44% increase  in supply,  and so to exhaust  the (fixed) level  of demand  the initial  share should
be 0.6944  = 1/1.44. It is precisely  because  Mercosur ust achieves  a market  share  of 100%  that  we know
that  the price  will not change.
19Even  though  only  a  small  proportion  of  commodities  offer  good  chances  of
transport-cost-based  benefits,  it  is  natural  to  ask  how  large  those  gains  might  be.
Unfortunately we do not in general know the transportation margins payable on Mercosur
exports, but following the lead of the previous section, let us assume that they are two-
thirds  of the margins on imports into Mercosur. Applying  this factor to  the weighted
averages of transport costs on imports from the rest of the world, the transport wedges are
given in the final column of table 3.  It is plain that if (as the model assumes) the current
Mercosur price is fixed by world prices, there is scope for substantial prices falls as a
result of integration-up  to nearly 40% in the 95-99.9% category and over 20% in the
other  plausible  categories.  Such price  falls  could  generate  substantial  increases  in
consumer surpluses.
It is also interesting to consider the commodity break-down of the categories of
goods in table 3.  Table 4 offers a disaggregation into industry groups with each triplet
reporting the number of headings (n), the value of intra-Mercosur imports (x) and  the
transport cost on imports from outside Mercosur r.  The highest trade shares are mostly
found in agriculture and,  indeed, for most  of agriculture, trade shares are high.  That
implies  that  for  agriculture  Mercosur  could  generate  significant  transport-cost-based
benefits.  The next most likely groups are ferrous products and textiles relatively and the
rest of manufacturing absolutely.
Table 5 extends this analysis to calculate the transport wedges more precisely on
US-Mercosur trade.  The classification of trade headings by Mercosur trade shares is the
20same  as  in  table  3,10 but  now  we  focus  on  the  sub-set  for  which  we  can  identify
Mercosur-US  trade  in  both  directions  exceeding  $30,000-i.e.  the  set  of  headings
analyzed in table 2. The sample is much smaller than previously-only  641 headings in
al-and  it suggests somewhat larger wedges than previously, especially in the relevant
"high-share" categories.
The conclusion of this section is that while transport wedges in international trade
are significant and appear to give plenty of scope for benefits from regional integration,
comparative advantage is less kind.  Rather few goods fall into the classes for which such
gains seem plausible.  Essentially we are seeking goods for which member exporters have
no pre-integration third-country partners and member importers have no post-integration
third-country partners.  We can not apply the former criterion at our level of aggregation,
but less than 10% of current Mercosur imports fall into headings for which the latter is
plausible.  All told, therefore, we should not expect major transport-cost-related gains to
integration through this causal channel.
4.  The Scope for Transport Efficiency Gains
Identifying the scope and the means for improvements in the efficiency of
international transportation is a technical and information-intensive activity.  We do not
pretend to be able to undertake a full investigation, but it does seem sensible to develop
our data sources a little in this direction. We consider the transportation component of
costs for Mercosur's and the United States' imports from a series of distant suppliers,
10  The trade  headings  in each class in table 5 are a sub-set  of those in the corresponding  class in table 3.
21roughly equidistant from Mercosur and the United States-Germany,  Japan, India and
Thailand.  By choosing distant suppliers we hope to maximize the differences in costs on
the two routes and reduce the effects of any idiosyncratic features of the exporter's
circumstances.  We do this only for Argentina, Brazil and Chile because the number of
trade headings for which both Uruguay (Paraguay) and the United States import material
amounts for the same source is very limited.  We also restrict ourselves to headings in
which both the United States and Mercosur report trade by weight, so that we can
examine cost both per unit of value and per unit of weight.
Table 6 reports four statistics for each exporter-importer pair: the number of HS
6-digit  trade  headings  for  which  both  the  United  States and  the  Mercosur  country
imported over $30,000 from the exporter; the percentage of these for which the difference
in percentage transport costs (United States minus Mercosur) is positive (i.e., US costs
exceed  those  of the  Mercosur  country); the  unweighted difference and  the  weighted
difference  (weighted by  the Mercosur  country's  imports).  Particularly  for the larger
exporters  Germnany  and  Japan  there  are good  sized samples  and  firm  evidence  that
Mercosur's  costs exceed the United States.  This is true of over 80% headings and the
average difference is 2-4% for Germany and 4-8% for Japan.  For geographical reasons
one might expect the differences to be larger for Germany-Chile, and Japan-Argentina-
Brazil.  There is a small amount of evidence for higher Germany-Chile differentials in the
weighted averages, but not  in the unweighted averages or proportion-positive  counts.
Moreover, Chile's disadvantage seems to be larger for imports from Japan.  The results in
table 6 are not strictly comparable across columns because the headings included vary by
22importer-the  requirement was that the United States and, say, Brazil both  import the
good from the exporters.  If we recalculate it, however, using only headings imported
(over $30,000) by the United States and all three Mercosur importers, the story remains
the same.
Turning to the developing country exporters the samples are much smaller, but the
story  is  much  the  same-slightly  greater  differentials  for  Argentina  and  Brazil  and
slightly smaller for Chile, as geography dictates.  In these cases, however, the number of
headings relevant to all three importers is zero for India and one for Thailand, so strict
cross-Mercosur comparisons are not possible.
Since the United States may import higher quality (dearer) goods than Mercosur it
may be that its lower percentage transport cost reflects equal absolute costs deflated by a
higher value in the denominator.  Recalculating table 6 on the basis of transport costs per
kilogram  suggests that  this  is  not  the  case.  The proportion  of positive  differences
increases  for  Argentina  to  around  one  quarter,  but  all  the  averages  are  still  firmly
negative.
This section has identified that, on average, the major Mercosur countries pay
more for transporting their imports than does the United States, but it does not say why.
It may be due to largely unavoidable factors such as smaller consigmnent size, smaller
overall volumes, or different seasonality.  It may, on the other hand, be due to the age of
equipment, competition in the transportation sector, or port efficiency. 1'  The fact that
1l][nefficient  ports can raise  reported  shipping  costs  because  they increase  the turn-around  times  on ships
and planes.
23Chile shows no advantage over Argentina and Brazil, however, casts some doubt on the
latter factors, however, for Chile undertook fairly major reforms in the 1980s-see
Bennathan (1989).  Moreover, since 1993 several reforms and modernizations have been
made, so even if we have identified problems in our exercise, they may be on their way to
being resolved.
5.  Conclusion
This paper has explored what benefits might occur to the introduction of free trade
between the Mercosur countries and Chile as a result of their geographical proximity.  It
found that transportation margins on intra-Mercosur and Mercosur-Chile trade are lower
than those on trade with the rest of the world by about 6 percentage points.  This is a
significant margin and it was presumably reflected in the countries'  trade patterns even
before regional arrangements reduced the policy-based barriers to mutual trade.  When it is
interacted with such regional arrangements, however, a margin of 6 percentage points is
rather small, and offers little justification in and of itself for pursuing regional preferences.
That is, the benefits or costs of regional integration are not very different if the transport
cost differential is 6% from if it is zero.  Thus Mercosur plus Chile is not sufficiently much
of a natural trading bloc (in terms of transportation costs) to warrant the introduction of
preferences in the absence of other resulting benefits.
The conclusion of the previous paragraph reflects a comparison between observed
transportation margins and  Mercosur imports-derived  originally for  this  paper-with
theoretical values derived by Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995). To the extent that the latter's
24model is not  applicable to  the real world-a  fairly significant extent-it  is, of course,
tentative.
A second approach to assessing the effects of transportation costs on the benefits
of regional integration focuses just on the costs of trading with the rest of the world.  The
sum of these costs on exports and on imports defines a range of prices within which a
good becomes non-traded for the Mercosur region-in  the sense of conducting no trade
with the non-Mercosur world.  Within these wedges regional integration can affect local
prices and thus have significant effects on economic welfare.  These wedges appear to be
large-over  40% in some cases and frequently over 20%.  However, the set of goods for
which  it  is  plausible  that  trade  with  the  rest  of  the  world  will  cease following  the
introduction of  Mercosur preferences is  small-certainly  no  more  than  10% of  total
Mercosur imports.  Overall, therefore, it seems that Mercosur is not a sufficiently "natural"
bloc in this second sense either to reap big rewards from regional arrangements.
Finally, we explored the relative sizes of transportation costs on imports into the
main Mercosur countries and into the United States.  The evidence suggests that Mercosur
pays two  to  four percentage points  more.  Future research and policy  analyses might
usefully explore why.
25Table 1:  Average Transportation Costs on Imports to Mercosur Countries and Chile, 1993a
Market  percent
Exporter  Argentina  Brazil  Paraguay  Uruguay  Chile
Mercosur  6.2  5.6  10.8  2.6  8.9
Rest of World (except Chile)  12.3  12.2  22.7  14.0  12.7
Argentina  - 6.0  12.2  2.4  8.3
Brazil  6.7  - 10.4  3.3  9.2
Paraguay  6.3  2.6  - 4.9  10.9
Uruguay  4.6  6.2  16.2  - 16.1
Chile  8.1  10.7  14.5  8.0  -
Europe  11.3  12.4  18.8  12.5  13.2
US-Canada  14.5  15.4  23.8  12.1  12.5
Asia  16.8  19.3  25.5  16.2  14.9
a  Weighted averages using imports from Mercosur as weights.
Trade flows with reported costs of zero excluded.
26Table 2:  Transportation Wedges on US-Mercosur Trade by Sector
Transport  Transport
Mercosur  Mercosur  on  on  Transport
No. of  Exports  Imports  Exports (a)  Imports (b)  Wedge (c)
Headings  $mill.  $mill.  (%)  (%)  (%)
Agriculture  67  420.1  57.8  8.60  15.48  21.43
Cereals  4  6.9  13.8  23.92  17.74  43.66
Other Primary Goods  55  132.4  64.1  14.71  13.35  41.71
Mineral Fuels  3  2.8  15.7  26.73  21.51  46.20
Salt, Sulphur, Ores  8  65.3  3.3  24.08  18.90  83.73
Manufactures  519  1,717.4  1,509.4  7.37  8.68  18.96
Artificial Resins and Plastics  48  87.2  265.9  9.57  11.45  22.31
Ferrous Products, Iron and Steel  86  250.2  82.9  8.87  11.33  21.14
Machinery  32  280.7  324.9  5.49  5.33  11.00
Vehicles  4  98.9  40.6  7.25  8.25  16.43
Textiles  121  286.4  70.0  6.44  11.55  19.39
(a) Weighted by Mercosur's exports.
(b) Weighted by Mercosur's imports.
(c) Weighted by Mercosur's exports plus imports.
Calculated at 6-digit HS level, 1993, flows exceeding $30,000 in each direction, Mercosur to US and US to MercosurTable 3: Transport Costs on Products Classified by Mercosur Trade Shares
Transport Costs on Imports from:
Mercosur Share of  No. of  % of Imports in  Mercosur  Rest of World  Mercosur  Rest of World  Assumed Trans-
Mercosur Imports  Headings  these Headings  -------simple averages-------  -----weighted averagesa----  port Wedgeb
100%  124  0.5  13.1  - 13.7  - -
95-99.9%  155  2.2  7.8  50.7  9.7  23.6  39.4
80-94.9%  230  3.3  7.3  19.8  5.5  14.7  24.6
60-79.9%  304  5.3  6.2  20.2  5.1  13.0  21.7
40-59.9%  398  8.5  6.0  16.5  3.5  11.6  19.4
<40%  3,647  80.3  8.8  14.7  6.1  10.5  17.5
a  Weighted by Imports from Mercosur.
b  Previous column multiplied by 1.67--see text.
ooTable 4:  Trade and Transport Costs Disaggregated  by Mercosur Trade Shares and Sector
Outr Primn.  rerrous  Rest of
Agric.  Mineral oil  Goods  Textiles  Footwear  Products  Machinery  Vehicles  Manuf.
Mercosur  n  $m  n  $m  n  $m  n  $m  n  $m  n  $m  n  $m  n  $m  n  $m
Share  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %
100%  67  92  3  14  6  55  14  1  - - 7  21  - - - - 27  14
95-99.9%  66  606  3  2  9  45  21  17  - - 19  63  1  3  1  1  35  81
24.0  20.9  17.3  25.1  - 27.6  17.6  65.4  21.0
80-94.9%  54  348  3  6  13  11  44  48  - - 29  66  8  55  6  153  73  393
14.7  26.8  29.5  12.3  - 14.1  13.9  9.6  16.5
60-79.9%  49  209  3  0  16  22  76  245  6  6  30  76  19  172  8  309  97  337
10.4  14.1  20.4  10.4  13.2  21.7  9.1  14.3  14.7
40-59.9%  48  75  2  1  18  7  88  67  2  8  39  49  32  174  15  929  154  306
14.8  18.3  28.1  12.2  8.4  11.5  8.2  10.9  14.4
<40%  343  257  24  439  207  59  546  104  21  20  181  91  702  743  46  149  1577  863
15.2  10.1  17.4  11.9  14.6  12.9  7.7  10.3  10.8
Legend:  Each entry comprises three figures  n  x
* - no. of headings.
x - value of intra-Mercosur imports ($ million).
T - transportation costs (percentage) on imports from outside Mercosur.
N)Table 5:  US-Mercosur Transport Wedges on Products Classified by Mercosur Trade Shares
Transport Costs on:
Mercosur  US Imports  Mercosur  US
Mercosur Share of  No. of  Imports  from  Imports from  Imports from  Transport
Mercosur Imports  Headings  from US  Mercosur  US  Mercosur  Wedgeb
-------simple averages------  --------weighted averagesa--------
100%
95-99.9%  3  24.8  28.8  26.8  33.9  64.3
80-94.9%  31  18.6  15.1  17.0  7.3  31.7
60-79.9%  49  16.3  10.9  15.5  7.2  22.6
40-59.9%  87  16.7  11.3  15.7  7.4  19.3
<40%  467  12.0  10.1  8.5  8.3  18.5
a  Weighted by Mercosur's  and US imports respectively.
b  Weighted by sum of Mercosur's  and US imports.
Trade values less than US$30,000 are excluded.
CDTable 6:  Differences between Transport Costs on Export to the United States
and to Main Latin American Countriesa
Market:
Exporter  Argentina  Brazil  Chile
no. of trade headings
Germany  722  785  600
Japan  236  412  200
Inidia  86  21  21
Thailand  25  6  33
% of positive differences
Germany  19  18  17
Japan  11  16  13
India  10  14  24
Thailand  8  0  21
mean difference in percent (unweighted)
Ge  rmany  -3.0  -4.0  -3.77
Japan  -5.7  -8.2  -6.5
India  -7.8  -5.7  -4.8
ThLailand  -8.4  -6.1  -4.8
mean difference in percent (weighted)
Germany  -2.0  -1.8  -4.1
Japan  -4.1  -5.1  -7.4
India  -7.8  -3.3  -5.2
Th,ailand  -4.3  -7.3  -4.1
a  Commodities for which exports to both US and Latin American countries
exceed $30,000 and for which US reports trade quantities by weight.
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